eBPF Runtime

eBPF Runtime is the architectural term for the end-to-end layer that observes CI/CD job process, network, file, domain, and HTTP activity. There is no eBPFRuntime or KernelRuntime type or package. The implementation is split across kernel-loaded programs in internal/agent/bpf, kernel-facing I/O in internal/agent/kerneltracker/kernelio, and userspace tracking and attribution in internal/agent/kerneltracker. The kernel baseline is Linux 5.15+.

Why cgroup v2 tracking

When monitoring CI/CD runtime, deciding how much of the OS to observe is the core design tradeoff.

cicd-sensor uses cgroup v2. Kernel hooks check whether the current cgroup is in tracked_cgroups and fast-drop unrelated events. The userspace KernelTracker keeps a cgroup_id -> JobIdentity mirror and decides which job receives each EventRecord.

Process context is attached to events as a fat-node snapshot (exec_path, argv, ancestors). It is not walked at evaluation time. The source of truth for job membership is cgroup tracking, not process context.

flowchart LR
    JOB["CI/CD Job"]
    CG["tracked cgroups<br/>cgroup v2 IDs"]
    BPF["eBPF programs<br/>observe / fast drop"]
    RB["ringbuf samples"]
    KT["KernelTracker<br/>userspace mirror"]
    WORKER["Job event worker"]

    JOB --> CG
    CG --> BPF
    BPF --> RB
    RB --> KT
    KT -->|"EventRecord"| WORKER

    classDef cicdSensor fill:#ecfdf5,stroke:#0f766e,color:#134e4a,stroke-width:1.5px;
    class KT cicdSensor

Tracking model

When a CI/CD job starts a container through the host-side Docker socket, the actual container process may enter a separate cgroup created by dockerd, not a descendant cgroup of the job process. In that case, cgroup membership alone cannot track the container as part of the job.

The Docker proxy checks the peer process of the Docker create request and determines whether that process belongs to a tracked job cgroup. If it does, the proxy stages the basename of the container cgroup that will be created and associates it with the job. Later, when the kernel-side cgroup_mkdir hook observes the actual container cgroup creation, that staging entry is promoted and the container cgroup is added to the job’s tracked cgroups.

cgroup_rmdir does not immediately delete non-final cgroups from tracked_cgroups. KernelTracker marks them removed and purges them after the 10-second grace period plus the next purge tick, so in-flight samples that arrive after rmdir can still be attributed to the Job. If the removed cgroup is the Job’s last active cgroup, KernelTracker ends the Job immediately and lets normal Job finalization clean up kernel and userspace state. KernelTracker also periodically scans the cgroup v2 root from userspace and reconciles active tracked cgroups, so a missed cgroup_rmdir sample does not leave stale cgroups or Jobs indefinitely.

Event coverage

The eBPF Runtime handles both rule-facing events and internal tracking samples.

cgroup/connect4/6 is not attached per tracked cgroup. The agent attaches once to the cgroup v2 root detected at startup, and the program uses tracked_cgroups lookup to handle only target jobs.

unix_stream_connect / unix_dgram_connect observe AF_UNIX connects at the proto_ops entry points, so connects denied earlier by an LSM (AppArmor, SELinux, BPF LSM) are not observable.

When --enable-http-request=true, the http_request hook detects cleartext HTTP by content, not by port: a send whose first bytes match a request-method token is parsed in eBPF (request line + Host only, query stripped at ?), and only the parsed method / path / host fields leave the kernel — the raw send prefix stays in a per-CPU scratch map and never enters the ring buffer. TLS writes start with a record byte and never match a method token; KTLS plaintext sends are intercepted by the TLS ULP before tcp_sendmsg and do not reach the hook. The OpenSSL path reads HTTP/1.x before encryption, while the nghttp2 path reads HTTP/2 pseudo-headers before HPACK encoding. See HTTP Uprobe Runtime for the discovery rationale, attach and event lifecycle, selected functions, verified clients, and known gaps.

The mount event records classic bind/move and new-API move_mount attempts; ordinary classic filesystem mounts are filtered before ring-buffer reservation. The event intentionally does not classify bind, attach, and move: security_move_mount does not expose enough context to distinguish them. Classic mount source paths are raw operation strings, while mount targets and new-API move paths use the bounded dentry fallback because bpf_d_path is not available from these hooks on the Linux 5.15 baseline. These fields describe the operation rather than a canonical identity for later file writes. Observing a mount therefore does not detect writes through aliases that existed before the Job started.

Kernel / userspace boundary

BPF map state is limited to fast-path scope and bounded suppression decisions. It does not contain JobIdentity, process context, symbol data, or uprobe links; those remain in the KernelTracker/KernelIO userspace owners.

BPF maps

staging_map does not contain JobIdentity. The kernel side only matches the basename; userspace mirror state knows which job it belongs to.

KernelTracker userspace state

EventRecord delivery pressure

KernelTracker owns the boundary between decoded kernel samples and each Job’s event worker. Each Job has a bounded EventRecord channel; the default capacity is 64k records. The bound is intentional: a slow or blocked Job worker must not create unbounded memory growth in the agent.

file_open can be much higher volume than process, network, or domain events. Repeated reads of the same file by the same process are common during package install, build, and runtime startup. If those repeated records fill the per-Job channel, later process_exec or unique credential-like file reads can be dropped before rule evaluation sees them.

To protect the delivery path, KernelTracker suppresses repeated same-key file_open records before enqueueing them into the Job channel. This is a delivery-pressure optimization, not a rule semantic change:

• the first successfully enqueued event for a key is preserved;
• unique paths are not collapsed;
• truncated, malformed, or incomplete file_open records are not suppressed;
• non-file_open event types are never deduplicated by this path.

The dedup key is explicit rather than a generic payload hash:

The dedup state is per Job, loop-local to KernelTracker, and bounded. It keeps up to 4096 file-open keys per Job; this is separate from the 64k per-Job EventRecord channel capacity. It uses FIFO eviction rather than LRU so a hot repeated key does not refresh itself forever and evict newer unique keys. The FIFO order is stored as a fixed-size ring buffer, so inserts remain O(1) after the per-Job key limit is reached. KernelTracker records delivery diagnostics internally (attempted, delivered, dropped, suppressed_duplicates, and max_queue_depth) and logs a summary when a Job is removed if drops or suppression occurred. Manager runtime_event output uses the same 64k queue capacity so the post-evaluation log path does not immediately become the next bottleneck; detection and summary outputs keep the smaller manager-output queue because they are not raw event streams.

The BPF events ring buffer is a node-level ingress buffer before KernelTracker can attribute samples to Jobs. KernelIO sizes it from node CPU count, so larger runner nodes get a larger kernel-to-userspace buffer before per-Job delivery begins.

Implementation layout

internal/agent/bpf owns the eBPF assets, and internal/agent/kerneltracker owns the userspace reactor. Generated artifacts (bpf2go output) are not edited by hand — fix the C source or generator input.